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Abstract 
The implementation of President George H. W. Bush’s 1989 Andean Initiative brought to 
the fore competing US and Bolivian agendas. While US embassy officials sought to exert 
control in pursuit of militarised policies, the Bolivian government’s ambivalence towards 
the coca-cocaine economy underpinned opposition to the ‘Colombianisation’ of the 
country. This article deconstructs prevailing top-down, US-centric analyses of the drug war 
in Latin America to examine how US power was exercised and resisted in the Bolivian 
case. Advancing a more historically grounded understanding of the development of the US 
drug war in Latin America, it reveals the fluidity of US–Bolivian power relations, the 
contested nature of counter-drug policy at the country level, and the instrumentalisation of 
the ‘war on drugs’ in distinct US and Bolivian agendas. 
Keywords: ‘War on Drugs’; illicit drug economy; coca; US role in Latin America; North–
South power relations 
1 
 
Introduction 
The reason we were down there to begin with was because of the massive flow of 
cocaine into the United States, which was killing our kids.1 
The ‘war on drugs’, like the Cold War, was used to justify everything.2  
The implementation of President George H. W. Bush’s 1989 Andean Initiative brought 
to the fore competing US and Bolivian agendas: US embassy officials sought to exert 
control over the Bolivian government and security forces in pursuit of counter-drug goals, 
while local ambivalence towards the coca-cocaine economy, and the prioritisation of 
political, social and economic stability, resulted in opposition to US drug war policies and 
the perceived ‘Colombianisation’ of Bolivia. Distinct US and Bolivian narrative tropes 
supported this dynamic: for the former, US exceptionalism and securitised conceptions of 
drugs;3 for the latter, the ‘democracy generation’, ‘Yankee Imperialism’ and the legacy of 
the Cold War. This article elucidates these narratives and traces the contested nature of 
counter-drug policy at the country level. In so doing, it deconstructs top-down, US-centric 
analyses of the drug war in Latin America to examine how US power was exercised and 
resisted in the Bolivian case. Such top-down analyses underplay the ‘messiness’ of policy 
implementation, and thus fail to acknowledge fully how policy is negotiated by different 
actors with different objectives.4 The article considers interactive effects between the 
‘messy’ local context and the conduct of the ‘war on drugs’ to challenge broad assumptions 
around US–Bolivian power asymmetries. 
                                               
1 Interview with Charles R. Bowers, US ambassador to Bolivia (1991–4), 12 April 2013. 
2 Interview with Jaime Paz Zamora, president of Bolivia (1989–93), 26 April 2014. 
3 Securitisation refers to a process through which specific issues are transformed into matters of 
‘security’. This transformation typically occurs through public discourse: relevant audiences 
are convinced of the ‘existential threat’ posed by the issue. In the case of the ‘war on drugs’, 
key US state actors viewed the issue of drug use and the drug trade through the lens of security, 
rather than through those of public health or development, for example. For more on 
securitisation, see Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework 
for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997). 
4 David Mansfield, A State Built on Sand: How Opium Undermined Afghanistan (London: 
Hurst, 2016), p. 5. 
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The analysis focuses on interactions between elite political actors, drawing on 27 oral 
history accounts gathered during fieldwork in the United States and Bolivia over 2013 and 
2014.5 Interviewees include US government officials with direct and indirect experience of 
counter-supply efforts in the Andes in the 1980s and 1990s, some of whom had been based 
in the US embassy in La Paz; and Bolivian officials and politicians from around the time of 
the Jaime Paz Zamora government (1989–93). I gained access to these individuals through 
a variety of means, for example: contact through third parties, such as the American 
Foreign Service Association or journalists, and ‘snowballing’ from early interviews. During 
the process of gaining informed consent, all participants were offered options around 
anonymity and the use of direct quotes.6 Many chose to speak on the record, and appeared 
frank in their views. While some speculation is necessary here, it seemed that the historic 
nature of the topic underpinned their willingness to provide relatively open accounts.7 
These actors played pivotal roles in determining the course of counter-drug policy in 
Bolivia, as well as in the wider political life of the country. The juxtaposition of their 
accounts exposes the competing priorities of the period, and the tensions between 
international and domestic political pressures that shaped the construction of policy at the 
country level. Documentary and secondary sources support interview data to provide 
granular analysis of US and Bolivian agendas; the narratives, motives and constraints that 
underpinned them; and the strategies pursued by different actors.  
                                               
5 See Annex Afor a full list of interviewees. 
6 In line with research institutional ethical approval (College of Arts, University of Glasgow), I 
provided participants with a written summary of the research and its aims, how their data would 
be used, and options around anonymity/direct quotes. Before each interview, I allowed time for 
questions and gave participants my contact details. Some requested the opportunity to sign off 
on the use of direct quotes. In these cases, participants were duly contacted. All approved the 
use of quotes.  
7 Most participants were semi-retired and hence felt that there was little to lose in speaking to 
me. Many seemed to enjoy the opportunity to reflect on the past and explore their role in the 
period. Perhaps they also saw me as a keeper of the historic record and wished to advance their 
perspective. For more on this latter theme, see: Antonius C. G. M. Robben, ‘The Politics of 
Truth and Emotion among Victims and Perpetrators of Violence’, in Carolyn Nordstrom and 
Antonius C. G. M. Robben (eds.), Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence 
and Survival (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995), p. 97. 
3 
 
This analysis reveals not only contestation during the policy implementation process and its 
links to historic political factors, but the instrumentalisation of the ‘war on drugs’ in US–
Bolivian relations of power and control. Power relations between the US embassy and the 
Bolivian government were fluid, as each side pursued its agenda. As well as drawing on US 
geopolitical and economic power, the embassy employed ‘on-the-ground’ tactics to exert 
control. Accusations of corruption were used by the embassy to leverage the Bolivian 
government, while ‘drug war proxies’ – local counter-drug units funded and largely 
directed by the United States – allowed for the bypassing of ‘uncooperative’ elements of 
the Bolivian state. Within the Bolivian government, such actions were held as emblematic 
of US ‘imperialistic’ strategies in South America, with the drug war supposedly used to 
silence leftist opponents. Here, the narratives and dynamics of the Cold War still had major 
influence. Bolivian actors responded with their own strategies of resistance. Most notably, 
the Repentance Decree, discussed below – giving reduced sentences for traffickers who 
turned themselves in, and thereby representing a less confrontational, Bolivian, ‘solution’ 
to the issue – stood in contrast to US securitised conceptions of the ‘drug problem’. In such 
ways, the ‘war on drugs’ was interwoven with local political concerns and historic trends of 
US–Bolivian relations.  
Top-down, US-Centric Analyses of the ‘War on Drugs’ in Latin America 
Much of the literature on the US ‘war on drugs’ in Latin America assumes particular 
North–South power asymmetries.8 While it is certainly the case that the United States has 
been the primary driving force of international counter-drug efforts in Latin America over 
the past 40 years,9 top-down, US-centric analyses often understate country-level dynamics, 
                                               
8 For example: Bruce M. Bagley and Jonathan D. Rosen (eds.), Drug Trafficking, Organized 
Crime, and Violence in the Americas Today (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 
2015); Suzanna Reiss, We Sell Drugs: The Alchemy of US Empire (Oakland, CA: University of 
California Press, 2014); Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin (eds.), Drugs and Democracy in 
Latin America: The Impact of US Policy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 2005). 
9 Latin American leaders, past and present, have more recently advocated for a change of tack, 
presenting a distinct Latin American vision for counter-drug responses. For example, the Latin 
American Commission on Drugs and Democracy included former-presidents Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso of Brazil, César Gaviria of Colombia and Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico. The 
commission came together in 2008 to evaluate the impacts of the ‘war on drugs’ in the region 
and explore alternatives. 
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i.e. the interactions between actors with distinct agendas that affect policy implementation. 
Examination of these interactions provides insights into how US power was actually 
exercised and, at times, resisted by local governmental actors. This section thus 
deconstructs top-down analyses of the US drug war in Latin America. These analyses are 
important to the Bolivian case: US power ensured the export of the Andean Initiative; and 
drug war narratives shaped country-level dynamics. However, their underlying assumptions 
are insufficient to account for the fluidity of power relations.  
Extending the US Drug War to the South 
The extension of the US drug war to Latin America is built on domestic and international 
premises. Domestically, Francisco Thoumi argues that the moralistic ‘perceptions, 
principles and prejudices’ of the US cultural views of drugs have had persistent and 
enduring influence on US drug policy.10 Drugs are viewed as tearing at the fabric of 
mainstream US society, as evident in periodic domestic drug scares and the demarcation – 
and demonisation – of ethnic minorities and fringe groups in the United States.11 The drug 
‘threat’ necessitates hard-line responses, representing a belief that ‘drug evils will be 
“wiped out” or at least fundamentally contained’12 through stringent enforcement 
measures.13 This ‘threat’, in turn, underpins the impulse to pursue counter-supply efforts 
abroad. For example, as the ‘crack-cocaine epidemic’ came to dominate the US political 
agenda in the 1980s, attention turned towards the source in Latin America. Presidential 
administrations of the period asserted that the United States would fight a ‘war on drugs’ in 
the Andes to stem the flow of drugs from the South and protect US society. Echoing the 
                                               
10 Francisco E. Thoumi, Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes (Baltimore, MD: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), p. 27. 
11 For example: Kathleen J. Frydl, The Drug Wars in America, 1940–1973 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013); Craig Reinarman and Harry G. Levine (eds.), Crack in 
America: Demon Drugs and Social Justice (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1997). 
12 Paul Gootenberg, ‘Talking about the Flow: Drugs, Borders and the Discourse of Drug 
Control’, Cultural Critique, 71 (Winter 2009), p. 37. 
13 Reflecting its post-WWII hegemony, the United States successfully transposed this 
prohibitionist model onto the international drug control regime. See David Bewley-Taylor, The 
United States and International Drug Control, 1909–1997 (London: Continuum, 1999). 
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moralistic dichotomies of domestic narratives, the evils of drug trafficking would be 
defeated by prohibitionist policies.14 
International premises of the US drug war in Latin America, meanwhile, were rooted in the 
advancement of post-Cold War securitisation. A range of non-traditional security threats 
was identified during this period, as the United States and its Western allies sought to 
extend order to the ‘ungoverned spaces’ of the world.15 The cocaine economy was seen as a 
threat to regional and global security, incorporating the destabilising effects of powerful 
and violent drug trafficking empires in ‘America’s backyard’, and the use of drug revenues 
by armed actors, i.e. supposed ‘narco-guerrillas’ or ‘narco-terrorists’.16 Within this policy 
discourse, defeat of the drug trade was a necessary first step to establishing security and the 
conditions for political and socio-economic development. The moralistic mission of 
eliminating drugs was thus aligned with other stated US foreign policy goals in Latin 
America. US political actors have argued that counter-drug policies are beneficial to source 
and transit nations, securing peace, stability and free-market democracies.17 Latin American 
governments which challenged this model were subject to US sanctions for failing to fulfil 
international drug control obligations and their motives called into question, with 
suspicions raised of complicity or permissiveness towards the drug trade. The US 
government used this narrative to justify the extension of its drug war border to the South:18 
                                               
14 Russell C. Crandall, ‘Explicit Narcotization: US Policy towards Colombia during the Samper 
Administration’, Latin American Politics and Society, 43: 2 (2001), p. 100. 
15 Patrick Meehan, ‘Fortifying or Fragmenting the State? The Political Economy of the 
Opium/Heroin Trade in Shan State, Myanmar, 1988–2013’, Critical Asian Studies, 47: 2 
(2015), p. 259. 
16 For example: Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), National Drug Control 
Strategy (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990). 
17 Brian Loveman, ‘US Security Policies in Latin America and the Andean Region, 1990–
2006’, in Brian Loveman (ed.), Addicted to Failure: US Security Policy in Latin America and 
the Andean Region (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), pp. 1–52. 
18 Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade 
(Chicago, IL: Lawrence Hill, 2003), p. 443. 
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expanding US counter-drug presence and militarised policies abroad, fortifying foreign 
state security forces and eradicating drug crops.  
The literature has generally been critical of this drug war approach, highlighting the 
structural causes of the illicit economy in Latin America and the harmful effects of counter-
drug policies.19 Marginalised rural communities, for example, turn to coca cultivation due 
to poverty rather than greed or moral failure,20 while weak state institutions are vulnerable 
to powerful drug trafficking organisations.21 Well-funded, high-level organised crime has 
wreaked corruption and violence across the region. Drug war policies, though, have 
intensified and escalated such problems.22 Market-disruptive policy interventions, for 
example, have stimulated violent competition between rival traffickers, heightening 
insecurity.23 Human rights abuses carried out by militarised counter-drug units may be cited 
here, alongside damage to precarious livelihoods through forced eradication of drug 
crops.24 These perspectives emphasise Latin American victimhood, as a site both of the 
international cocaine trade and US drug war fervour. 
                                               
19 For example: Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza (eds.), Innocent Bystanders: Developing 
Countries and the War on Drugs (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010). 
20 Eric Gutierrez (ed.), ‘Drugs and Illicit Practices: Assessing their Impact on Development and 
Governance’, Christian Aid Occasional Paper, Oct. 2015. 
21 Jonathan D. Rosen and Hanna S. Kassab, ‘Introduction: Fragile States in the Americas’, in 
Jonathan D. Rosen and Hanna S. Kassab (eds.), Fragile States in the Americas (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington, 2017), pp. xii–xiii. 
22 For example: Lamond Tullis, Unintended Consequences: Illegal Drugs and Drug Policies in 
Nine Countries (Studies on the Impact of the Illegal Drug Trade) (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Reinner, 1995). 
23 Juan Camilo Castillo, Daniel Mejía and Pascual Restrepo, ‘Scarcity without Leviathan: The 
Violent Effects of Cocaine Supply Shortages in the Mexican Drug War’, Center for Global 
Development Working Paper 356, Feb. 2014, available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/scarcity-leviathan-effects-cocaine-supply-
shortages_1.pdf (last access 16 Jan. 2019). 
24 For example: Youngers and Rosin (eds.), Drugs and Democracy in Latin America. 
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According to this critique, the extension of the ‘war on drugs’ represents not benevolent US 
foreign policy intentions, but rather the prioritisation of US goals over local concerns. 
Counter-drug policies have been formulated – or ‘implicitly vetoed’ – in Washington with 
little meaningful input from host governments.25 Unilateral US threats of sanction, 
including ‘decertification’,26 have forced Latin American governments into compliance 
with drug policies. US geopolitical and economic power has marginalised legitimate 
concerns over the localised effects of drug war policies. Furthermore, the exercise of US 
power in this domain has at times been arbitrary and overtly political.27 Opaque metrics of 
progress have been deployed; US allies spared punishment, while opponents of US policy 
were censured. In this sense, the ‘war on drugs’ has served traditional US hemispheric 
goals of establishing power and influence throughout Latin America.28  
Contesting the ‘War on Drugs’  
These top-down analyses provide numerous insights into the US drug war in Latin 
America. At the country level, though, the broad assumption of North–South power 
asymmetry limits our understanding of how the ‘war on drugs’ has actually been 
implemented. On the US side, actors based in embassies throughout the region have 
enjoyed significant autonomy when navigating complex local contexts. To forward 
counter-drug goals, these actors have negotiated with host government counterparts, as well 
as weighing wider foreign policy objectives and the interests of other US agencies. Local 
political actors must also navigate these contexts, and balance myriad domestic pressures 
                                               
25 Thoumi, Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes, p. 309. 
26 US Congress established the process of ‘certification’ as part of the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act. This act obligated the president to report to Congress on the performance of partner 
governments in the area of counter-drug policy. Partner governments deemed to have failed in 
their drug control obligations would be ‘decertified’, which potentially entailed a range of 
economic sanctions. William L. Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine: How US Foreign Policy 
Created a Thriving Drug Industry in Central and South America (Chicago, IL: Lawrence Hill, 
2010), pp. 87–8. 
27 Julia Buxton, The Political Economy of Narcotics (London: Zed Books, 2006), p. 140. 
28 For example: Elizabeth Joyce, ‘Packaging Drugs: Certification and the Acquisition of 
Leverage’, in Victor Bulmer-Thomas and James Dunkerley (eds.), The United States and Latin 
America: The New Agenda (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 207–26. 
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against the demands of the United States. Studying the interaction of these differing 
agendas reveals the reality of power relations in Latin America, and their implications for 
the ‘war on drugs’. Aside from US geopolitical and economic influence, how has US power 
been exercised by actors at the country level? How have local political actors responded to 
US power and pursued distinct priorities? 
Answering such questions requires a move beyond ‘drug fetishism’. This refers to a 
tendency within the literature to view the ‘war on drugs’ narrowly through the lens of 
policy objectives: focusing on ‘the efficacy of specific counter-narcotics interventions and 
institutions’.29 Coca eradication in one location, for example, has been linked to rises in 
cultivation in other areas – the ‘balloon effect’.30 This is viewed as a simple economic 
mechanism of supply and demand, but such analysis relegates the livelihood strategies and 
agency of rural communities to the margins. It downgrades the political effects of changing 
patterns of cultivation, as different actors gain and lose from eradication policies.31 In the 
Bolivian case, coca unions adopted radical tactics of protest to protect their livelihoods and 
resist the incursion of US-backed eradication, affecting the terms of counter-drug policy 
debates and changing the calculations of high-level political actors.32 Counter-drug policies 
are applied within such multi-faceted social, political and economic settings, interwoven 
with the drug trade and its direct and indirect interests.   
This critique draws on David Mansfield’s analysis of opium-poppy bans in Afghanistan, 
where – he argues – drug control interventions are mistakenly seen as ‘discrete and 
bounded’; and the actions of different actors are viewed exclusively against drug control 
                                               
29 Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, p. 5. 
30 Stella M. Rouse and Moises Arce, ‘The Drug-Laden Balloon: US Military Assistance and 
Coca Production in the Central Andes’, Social Science Quarterly, 87: 3 (2006), pp. 540–57. 
31 Richard Snyder, ‘Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder? A Political Economy of Extraction 
Framework’, Comparative Political Studies, 39: 8 (2006), p. 951. 
32 Thomas Grisaffi, ‘From the Grassroots to the Presidential Palace: Evo Morales and the Coca 
Growers’ Union in Bolivia’, in Sian Lazar (ed.), Where Are the Unions? Workers and Social 
Movements in Latin America, the Middle East and Europe (London: Zed Books, 2017), pp. 44–
63. 
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objectives, as either inhibiting or advancing these goals.33 This restrictive focus, therefore, 
fails to adequately account for wider political dynamics: how counter-drug efforts are 
weighed against – and subsumed into – other agendas.  While grassroots actors such as 
cocaleros (coca leaf growers) and social movements undoubtedly shape these agendas, this 
article focuses on interactions between high-level US and Bolivian political actors. It builds 
on James Siekmeier’s history of US–Bolivian relations, which challenges the underlying 
assumptions of Bolivian dependency to examine the active role Bolivian actors played in 
shaping US actions.34 Active roles were played by officials of the Paz Zamora government, 
as they sought to manage relations with ‘drug warriors’ in the US embassy and pursued 
distinct aims.  
As part of this analytical focus, it is important to consider the utilisation of drug war 
narratives in relations between these actors. The ‘war on drugs’ has provided a logic of 
action for US and local actors in Latin America: US actors linked it to foreign policy goals 
of security, democracy and development, while political actors, from a defensive position, 
drew on its conceptual framework to argue that it was an imperialist project of the United 
States, and that resistance to US influence was a noble fight for security and democracy. 
Local political actors also claimed legitimacy through their own counter-drug efforts. These 
incongruous narratives are indicative of the rhetorical malleability of the ‘war on drugs’. 
The ‘war on drugs’ may be thought of less as ‘a specific guideline or articulated vision’, but 
rather as ‘multiple narratives’ used to ‘justify political action’ and ‘knit together’ diverse 
priorities.35 Recognising these multiple narratives again moves away from ‘drug fetishism’, 
which tends to view counter-drug implementation as ‘more coherent, concerted and 
coordinated’ than is ‘often seen in practice’.36 Instead, this article examines how such 
narratives were instrumentalised in relations of power and control between actors with 
diverse and, at times, competing goals.   
                                               
33 Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, p. 47. 
34 James Siekmeier, The Bolivian Revolution and the United States, 1952 to the Present 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 2011). 
35 Winifred Tate, Drugs, Thugs and Diplomats: US Policymaking in Colombia (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2015), p. 4. 
36 Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, p. 6. 
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Background: Introduction of the Andean Initiative 
As the Cold War drew to an end and public panic spread over the supposed ‘crack 
epidemic’ in the United States, George H. W. Bush made the ‘war on drugs’ a cornerstone 
of his presidency (1989–93). The Andean Initiative formed a crucial part of his 
administration’s response to the claimed national crisis. Emboldened by post-Cold War 
euphoria, the 1989 US$2.2 billion counter-drug aid package signalled the US government’s 
intent to defeat the cocaine supply at source.37 During this period, Colombia was the 
epicentre of the trade, with trafficking dominated by international criminal organisations 
based out of Medellín and Cali. Peruvian coca was estimated to constitute roughly two-
thirds of the total market, while Bolivia accounted for around a quarter of net coca 
cultivation over the late 1980s.38 The Andean Initiative sought to target the trade at each of 
these points in the coca-cocaine commodity chain. 
The three pillars of the strategy established the foundations for the modern-era of the US 
‘war on drugs’ in Latin America:39 eradication, interdiction and alternative development. 
The policy also sponsored a greater counter-drug role for the US Department of Defense’s 
Southern Command (Southcom) and their military partners in the South. The perceived 
unilateral militarisation of counter-drug efforts, though, was poorly received in the Andes, 
and so President Bush met with the governments of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru to ease 
concerns and ‘multi-lateralise’ the issue at the first Andean drug summit in Cartagena de 
Indias (Colombia).40 The governments of the region argued for increased emphasis on 
                                               
37 Interview with David Miller, National Security Council (NSC) deputy assistant secretary 
(1988–92), 3 May 2014. 
38 US State Department, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
International Narcotics Control Strategy (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
1990). 
39 Although President Richard Nixon had declared a ‘war on drugs’ in 1971, US counter-drug 
interventions into Latin America during this period were sporadic as Cold War goals dominated 
US foreign policy in the region. With the end of the Cold War, the ‘war on drugs’ rose up the 
political agenda, setting in motion a new era of US counter-drug policy in Latin America.  
40 William Walker III, ‘The Bush Administration’s Andean Initiative in Historical Perspective’, 
in Bruce Bagley and William Walker III (eds.), Drug Trafficking in the Americas (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Reinner, 1994), pp. 1–19. 
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institution-building and development, winning additional US funding for alternative 
development, formal recognition of the idea of ‘shared responsibility’, and a free trade 
agreement with the United States – the Andean Trade Preference Act (APTA).41 However, 
using the levers of US power (the promise of aid on one hand, decertification on the other), 
the Bush administration’s preferences for policy survived largely intact. Concessions 
gained at Cartagena were conditioned on acceptance of militarised counter-drug efforts and 
coca eradication targets.  
The US government viewed Bolivia as an important test case for its counter-drug approach. 
While it was strategically less significant than its Andean neighbours, US policymakers 
nevertheless recognised both its role within the regional trade and its symbolic importance 
to US counter-drug policy in Latin America.42 Furthermore, the size and dynamics of the 
Bolivian coca-cocaine economy made drug war success seem more attainable.43 Colombia, 
for example, was subject to widespread violence from powerful trafficking organisations, 
while its internal conflict was becoming ever more closely entwined with the drug trade. 
Sendero Luminoso in Peru was waging a violent campaign against the state, funded in part 
by drug revenues. Such problems were largely absent in Bolivia, as were the attendant 
complications of applying counter-drug efforts in such contexts.44 Historically, though, 
Bolivia had tended to be a low priority for US foreign policy due to its limited geopolitical 
and economic importance. As a result, ‘on-the-ground’ US actors enjoyed a degree of 
autonomy and influence in shaping US policy in Bolivia, within the broad parameters set 
                                               
41 NSC, ‘Andean Drug Summit’, NSC discussion paper, 1 Nov. 1989, in: National Security 
Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC (hereafter NSA), ‘War in Colombia: 
Guerrillas, Drugs and Human Rights in U.S.–Colombia Policy, 1988–2002’, NSA Electronic 
Briefing Book No. 69. 
42 Interview with John Carnevale, ONDCP official (1988–2002), 26 April 2013. 
43 Kathryn Ledebur, ‘Bolivia: Clear Consequences’, in Youngers and Rosin (eds.), Drugs and 
Democracy in Latin America, p. 145. 
44 US Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Report of Audit: Drug Control Activities in 
Bolivia, 2-CI-001 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991), Appendix A. 
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out in Washington.45  The US embassy in La Paz played a major role in determining what 
the policy meant in practice.  
Former US ambassadors to Bolivia Robert Gelbard (1988–91) and Charles Bowers (1991–
4) both noted that counter-drug strategy was subject to oversight mechanisms and hence 
had to align with the overall US approach. However, policymakers in Washington also 
recognised the need to adapt the policy to local conditions.46 This meant dealing with 
counterparts in the Bolivian government, balancing the objectives of counter-drug policy 
with wider US aims within the country, and managing a country team of multiple US 
agencies with overlapping and, at times, conflicting missions.47 How such actors 
understood and navigated the local context was crucial to the course of the ‘war on drugs’ 
in Bolivia.  
The US Embassy’s Priorities 
The differing styles of leadership of Gelbard and Bowers shaped US–Bolivian relations. 
Gelbard argued that his experiences as a young man in the Peace Corps in Bolivia had 
given him a deep understanding of the local context, equipping him to take a central role in 
shaping the US counter-drug approach in the country.48 His bullish and outspoken 
diplomacy, though, frequently caused friction with the Bolivian government. Although 
Bowers looked to keep a lower profile, he continued with the broad strategy put in place by 
Gelbard and pushed Bolivian counterparts to adopt it. For example, one of Bowers’ first 
actions as ambassador was to announce continued US support for the introduction of the 
Bolivian army into counter-drugs, while accepting that this would occur only following 
                                               
45 This trend was evident from the US reaction to the Bolivian Revolution in 1952. For 
example, see Kenneth D. Lehman, Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership 
(Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1999), pp. 106–7. 
46 Interview with Robert S. Gelbard, US ambassador to Bolivia (1988–91), 13 May 2013. 
47 For examples of this inter-agency friction, see Jaime Malamud-Goti, Smoke and Mirrors: 
The Paradox of the Drug Wars (Oxford: Westview, 1992). 
48 Interview with Gelbard. 
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ratification from the government.49 In our interview, he argued that a specifically Bolivian 
‘mind-set’ inhibited cooperation, in that local actors would bargain over certain issues 
rather than following through on terms they had previously agreed.50 Differences in policy 
emphasis between the two ambassadors’ terms, therefore, may be identified; but the central 
themes of the US approach remained settled.  
Drug control formed a triad of stated US foreign policy objectives in Bolivia, alongside 
democratic consolidation and economic development. As Bowers explains, ‘We had what 
we called “the three Ds”: democracy, drugs and development. That’s what we were about; 
what we were trying to do.’51 The US government argued that these goals were 
complementary. Hence, solving ‘America’s drug problem’ would also be beneficial to 
Bolivia. Informed by themes of American exceptionalism, US counter-drug policy was 
defended in terms of shared interests with the Bolivian people. In a letter to Ambassador 
Bowers, President Bush clearly asserted this vision.  
<ext>As leader of the democracies, our Nation faces an historic opportunity to help 
shape a freer, more secure, and more prosperous world, in which our ideals and way 
of life can truly flourish. As President, I intend to advance these objectives around 
the globe, and I look to you, as my personal representative in Bolivia, as my partner 
in this task.52 
In reality, the ‘war on drugs’ came to dominate the US agenda in Bolivia, at times to the 
detriment of other strategic goals.53 Former Ambassador David Greenlee (2002–6), who 
also served as deputy chief of mission to the US embassy from 1987 to 1989, explained that 
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Washington’s extensive allocation of resources to counter drugs pulled the US embassy in 
this direction: ‘When people say, “Well, what is it about Bolivia that links back to the 
States that really touches our interests?” It was, in those days – back in the late ’80s 
particularly – Bolivian cocaine hitting the streets of the US.’54 In sum, US politicians were 
more concerned with fighting a drug war in the Andes than in promoting democracy and 
meaningful development. This impacted on the priorities of the US embassy in La Paz. The 
domestic premises of the ‘war on drugs’ served as justification for US counter-drug 
objectives in Bolivia.  
<ext>I mean, the reason we were down there to begin with was because of the 
massive flow of cocaine into the United States which was killing our kids. Still is. 
[…] The basic thing is, that product made its way into the United States, so the goal 
was to stop that product coming in.55 
Translating this goal into a counter-drug strategy suited to the local context, though, 
revealed tensions between US objectives, no more so than around the issue of coca 
eradication.  
Coca cultivation was (and remains) a sensitive issue. Coca is interwoven with everyday life 
in Bolivia: holding cultural significance for indigenous communities, as well as being a 
widely used consumer product. Coca is also a source of livelihood for many rural families, 
whether for the local, legal domestic market, or for diversion to the illicit economy. As 
economic crisis and harsh structural reforms took hold during the 1980s, for example, the 
coca-cocaine industry acted as a social safety-net for many Bolivians.56 Eradicating 
Bolivia’s coca had potentially disastrous socio-economic implications for an already 
struggling country.  
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Coca unions provided strong representation for the sector. They drew on nationalist and 
anti-imperialist rhetoric, and on powerful narratives of coca as indigenous heritage.57 By 
the 1980s, the cocalero movement had fused its traditional Altiplano modes of rural 
organisation with the more militant tactics of the weakened mining unions.58 Frequently, 
cocaleros provided fierce opposition to US-backed counter-drug policies. Efforts by the 
Víctor Paz Estenssoro administration (1985–9) to eradicate ‘illegal’ coca and send the army 
into the Chapare region, for example, were met with road-blocks in June 1987. Resultant 
clashes with the security forces ended with the deaths of 11 coca growers.59 The June 1988 
Villa Tunari massacre of cocaleros and peasants by anti-narcotics police caused public 
outrage across Bolivia, and galvanised the cocalero movement. The coca unions pushed for 
recognition of their interests, winning significant government concessions. This included, 
for example, legal recognition of traditional coca growing zones, the prohibition of 
chemical defoliates in coca eradication operations and a legal obligation for the state to 
provide alternative development.60 Bolivian governments of the period were forced to 
consider not only the potential socio-economic impact of eradicating coca, but also the 
activism of the cocaleros. The issue of coca was thus linked to Bolivia’s social, political 
and economic stability. 
The US embassy recognised the sensitivity of this issue. Reporting on the fragile political 
situation to Washington several years before the Villa Tunari massacre, the embassy 
warned: ‘No, repeat no, Bolivian government has been able to survive against strong and 
united campesino opposition (campesinos increasingly view coca cultivation as the main 
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escape from abject poverty).’61 Although the Paz Estenssoro administration had committed 
Bolivia to an ambitious programme of eradication in exchange for US development 
assistance,62 progress towards targets was slow. The embassy attempted to balance 
demands from Washington to meet eradication goal against local realities. This meant 
promoting a strategy which shifted attention away from direct confrontation with the 
cocaleros, while promising reductions in coca cultivation.  
<ext>While accepting the necessity of continuing to pursue the traditional priority 
on eradication, [the embassy’s strategy] argues for greater emphasis on interdiction. 
The latter appears to have a far more immediate impact on coca by depressing 
prices (and implicitly cultivation), provokes far less governmental and opposition 
resistance and ultimately comes closer and faster to objectives.63 
The quotation indicates the clash of international and domestic pressures, and the 
embassy’s attempt to navigate them. Eradication remained a crucial tenet of the overall US 
drug control strategy. It served as the main indicator of ‘progress’, and politicians in the US 
Congress were eager to see a return for counter-drug assistance provided to Andean 
countries. The embassy had to placate such concerns. Indeed, during this period, US 
officials leveraged economic aid to pressure the Bolivian government to meet its targets.64 
Furthermore, the embassy – for the reasons given in the quotation above, and because such 
an approach would encourage uptake of alternative development programmes – also 
favoured interdiction.  
The US embassy’s dealings with Paz Zamora government (1989–93) in pursuing this 
agenda, though, were harmed by differing conceptualisations of the ‘drug problem’ and low 
levels of trust. This would lead the embassy to apply its own particular strategies of control.  
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US Leverage and Drug War Proxies 
US actors expressed frustration over the Bolivian government’s refusal to accept the 
securitised premises of the ‘war on drugs’.65 President Jaime Paz Zamora instead argued 
that Bolivia’s coca-cocaine economy was primarily a problem of development. In the 
following cable, for example, Ambassador Robert Gelbard relates his dissatisfaction at the 
Bolivian government’s lukewarm response to the capture of prominent drug trafficker 
Carmelo ‘Meco’ Domínguez.  
<ext>Paz Zamora – along with the bulk of Bolivians – continues to engage in a 
process of denial regarding virtually any other aspect of the drug problem in Bolivia 
other [sic] than coca cultivation and the sense that it is a problem only of economic 
development and poverty. This accounts for the extraordinary lack of reaction on 
the [Bolivian government’s] part after the truly impressive success in the operation 
against the Meco Dominguez organisation, i.e. if they were to acknowledge 
successes against drug trafficking organisations they would have to acknowledge 
the existence of a problem.66 
Diverging conceptualisations of the ‘drug problem’, supported by distinct narratives, 
were thus important factors in the competing US and Bolivian agendas of the period. These 
dynamics were evident, for example, during negotiations for an expanded counter-drug role 
for the Bolivian army. After sustained US pressure, in May 1990 Paz Zamora signed Annex 
III of the 1987 US–Bolivian anti-drug agreement, granting the army an ill-defined counter-
drug role.  The agreement provoked widespread opposition due to fears that ‘an invigorated 
army [might] endanger Bolivia’s fragile democratic institutions’, causing ‘an escalation in 
human-rights abuses and drug-related corruption’ and ‘unrest among farmers’ that could 
foster ‘an insurgent movement like those in Colombia and Peru’.67 The Bolivian army’s 
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past involvement in the drug trade raised concerns of increased institutional corruption,68 
while recent memories of the Villa Tunari massacre solidified public opposition to the 
militarisation of counter-drug operations. A coalition of civil society groups, including the 
cocaleros and the Church, protested against the move, finding support in the Bolivian 
Congress.69 Paz Zamora argued in public that US–Bolivian anti-drug agreement had 
secured significant economic support for Bolivia, and the military were ‘an inseparable part 
of the global strategy of alternative development’.70 Despite the agreement, though, Paz 
Zamora stalled on releasing the funds to the army. 
Using back channels to Paz Zamora’s right-wing coalition partners Acción Democrática 
Nacionalista (Nationalist Democratic Action, ADN), Ambassador Gelbard pushed for 
acceleration of the policy. As reported in US embassy cables,71 the Bolivian foreign 
minister, Carlos Iturralde of the ADN, said ‘in a straightforward manner that the “problem” 
is Paz Zamora, who is still not convinced that there really is a need for interdiction in 
Bolivia because he is really not convinced of a cocaine manufacturing problem and drug 
trafficking problem’. Gelbard stated his intention ‘to discuss these issues with the 
appropriate [Bolivian] officials, including President Paz Zamora, military commanders and 
other political leaders, particularly including [former US-backed dictator and ADN leader] 
General Banzer’; making it clear that Paz Zamora’s ‘mismanagement of many important 
issues’ and ‘lack of clear leadership and decision-making ability’ risked losing US 
economic assistance.  
Paz Zamora would eventually bow to this pressure in March 1991, and deploy the army in 
counter-drug operations. The deployment, though, proved to be short-lived. Societal 
protests, legal limits on the army’s role in the Chapare and historic rivalries with the police 
rendered the new anti-drug units ineffective. It was agreed on all sides that the policy 
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should be rolled back.72 However, the episode demonstrated the willingness of US officials 
to circumvent opponents in the Bolivian government and deal with (old) ideological allies, 
to secure compliance with drug war policy. 
US mistrust of the Paz Zamora administration, though, went deeper than a divergence of 
opinion over the nature of the drug problem. US actors believed official complicity in the 
drug trade underpinned opposition to drug control policies, viewing corruption ‘as the 
largest, single problem affecting US narcotics control efforts’.73 A US government report 
noted that the ‘political will’ of the Bolivian government was ‘questionable, as 
demonstrated by some recent appointments of corrupt officials to key drug control 
positions’.74 Gelbard stated ‘we were dealing with a corrupt government’,75 while former 
Ambassador Bowers claimed ‘there were a number of people who were not totally on 
board, […] in fact, they were corrupt, […] filling their pockets, […] bought off by the 
narco-traffickers’.76  
The US embassy thus saw the Paz Zamora government as an unreliable ally, and sought to 
target its ‘corrupt’ elements to assert control. For example, James C. Cason, the political 
counsellor at the La Paz embassy (1987–90), constructed ‘family trees’ of Bolivia’s drug 
trafficking organisations through a system of intelligence gathering that trawled public 
registries, electoral rolls, business records and media reports.77 This database was used to 
vet state officials and politicians.  
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<ext>We managed to get a number of interior ministers[,] police chiefs [and] other 
people fired and jailed using, in part, this kind of data […] When Jaime Paz Zamora 
became President we told him not to appoint certain corrupt police as Chief. Don’t 
put the police chiefs in these cities because they’re narco traffickers. And we 
showed them the information and they took our suggestion. And when they did put 
people in who turned out to be corrupt, with narco ties, we provided information to 
them about what they were doing and the President fired them.78 
From the US perspective, this system allowed for the removal of officials who 
represented a threat to counter-drug goals. Intervening in the internal politics of Bolivia and 
making definitive judgements on the presumed criminality of certain actors was justified 
according to drug war narratives: addressing the security threat of drugs and establishing 
the conditions for democracy. 
The embassy’s use of drug war proxies – ‘vicarious surrogates’ of the ‘war on drugs’79 – 
formed another part of its control strategy. The establishment and close monitoring of 
specialist anti-drug police and military units constituted an attempt to bypass ‘corrupt’ 
officials and exert US control on foreign soil. The Fuerza Especial de Lucha contra el 
Narcotráfico (Anti-Narcotics Special Task Force, FELCN), for example, was dependent on 
the US embassy for its resources and intelligence.80 Furthermore, the Unidades Móviles de 
Patrullaje Rural (Mobile Rural Patrol Units, UMOPAR) were funded and subject to 
oversight mechanisms from the US State Department Bureau of International Narcotics 
Matters, trained by Southcom special forces in paramilitary tactics, and directed in 
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operations by the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).81 Close working 
relationships between the DEA and local commanders allowed the United States to 
circumvent more senior officials, with presumed ‘conflicts’.82 US geopolitical and 
economic power in forming these units was thus translated into US presence and power on 
the ground in Bolivia.  
This dynamic provoked complaints that Bolivian sovereignty had been compromised by 
unfettered US operations. Former President Jaime Paz Zamora claimed that ‘the US 
embassy had their own people in the Bolivian police and the army; their own people. We 
had problems with the US when we did things without their people.’83 Bolivian actors 
sought to resist these modes of US control, arguing that drug war goals had been prioritised 
over local concerns of political, social and economic stability. 
The Bolivian Government Agenda 
During his electoral campaign in 1989, Paz Zamora had emphasised his anti-drug war 
credentials. He looked to seize on public unrest over US-backed counter-drug efforts on 
Bolivian soil, from the Villa Tunari massacre to the joint military raids of Operation Blast 
Furnace in 1986.84 Paz Zamora drew on a Bolivian tradition of ‘coca nationalism’ that 
plays into domestic politics, binding the ‘sacred leaf’ to national identity and seeking to 
reclaim its cultural heritage.85 He wore a coca leaf pin in his lapel on the campaign trail,86 
promising that his Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Leftist Revolutionary 
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Movement, MIR) party would restore national dignity and sovereignty to Bolivia.87 Upon 
taking office, he was critical of the Andean Initiative’s militarised focus and argued on the 
international stage for a shift to a more development-led approach.88 While his ADN 
coalition partners were more closely aligned to the United States, the Bolivian government 
generally looked to change the narrative around the nation’s ‘drug problem’. Slogans such 
as ‘coca for development’, ‘coca is not cocaine’89 and ‘shared responsibility’ played down 
US securitised conceptions of drugs and defended the reputation of the coca leaf.  
These arguments also reflected pragmatic views of Bolivia’s coca-cocaine economy. 
President Paz Estenssoro had implemented deep structural reforms as part of the Nueva 
Política Económica (New Economic Policy, NPE) in 1985. The government’s neoliberal 
policies brought hyperinflation under control and made Bolivia a poster child of the 
Washington Consensus.90 The three major Bolivian political parties – the Movimiento 
Nacionalista Revolucionario (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, MNR), ADN and MIR 
– were convinced of the necessities of continuing down the path of neoliberal reform.91 
However, the social costs of these policies were high: levels of poverty increased, living 
standards dropped and unemployment soared.92 As one of the few booming areas of the 
economy, the coca-cocaine trade offered a solution for many of those affected. A US 
government report in 1991 estimated that 350,000 people were directly or indirectly reliant 
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on coca for income and the drug trade accounted for up to 30 per cent of Bolivia’s GDP.93 
It was also widely accepted that cocaine dollars had helped to stabilise national reserves 
during the country’s mid-decade debt crisis, an ‘unintended consequence’ of neoliberal 
reforms that lifted capital controls in the banking sector.94 In addition to this, Bolivia did 
not experience high levels of drug-related violence. Comparing Bolivia to Colombia, with 
its descent into violence, former Interior Minister Carlos Saavedra claimed: ‘Here, drug 
trafficking was not violent. Here, there had been no bomb blasts or kidnappings of 
politicians, journalists or judges. Here, there had been practically no revenge killings by 
traffickers.’95 These realities created a level of ambivalence towards the illicit economy. 
Former-president Jaime Paz Zamora stated, ‘Dirty money, yes, but [money] that enters our 
country: [investment] that will die if we combat [the drug trade]’.96 During negotiations 
over the Andean Initiative, therefore, the Bolivian government argued for policies that 
recognised these dynamics.  
The Bolivian government claimed success in these negotiations, winning significant 
concessions. Paz Zamora took a similar approach to his predecessor, leveraging the drug 
issue for further economic support to mitigate and bolster the government’s neoliberal 
reforms.97 The APTA free-trade deal and more funding for alternative development aimed 
to reduce the national economy’s dependence on coca. Bolivia would also receive US$830 
million in aid over the course of the planned five-year initiative, with a sizeable proportion 
allotted to Economic Support Funds (ESFs) (see Figure 1).98 ESF funding would be used to 
compensate for the economic effects of curbing the drug trade, as well as for financing 
‘government payment of US and multilateral debt and US exports to the Bolivian private 
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sector’.99 Support was linked to counter-drug targets and back-loaded, i.e. designed to kick 
in as interdiction and eradication efforts took hold. ‘I more than achieved my objectives’, 
Paz Zamora argued. ‘I was going [to Washington] with the problem of opening the market 
and [easing] the external debt. We resolved it thanks to direct conversations with the 
President.’100 As the policy was implemented, though, cracks began to appear: ‘Bush was a 
very good president, but the administration was bad.’101  
Figure 1. US Counter-Drug Related Assistance to Bolivia (1987–95) 
 
Source: US Agency for International Development (USAID), ‘U.S. Overseas Loans and 
Grants (Greenbook)’, available at https://www.usaid.gov/data/dataset/49c01560-6cd7-
4bbc-bfef-7a1991867633, last access 15 Feb. 2019. 
Actors within the Bolivian government believed that enforcement-led policies had come to 
dominate the US approach. Indicating a gap between the policy as written and the policy as 
executed, one ADN senior minister argued that ‘the plan didn’t work, because we were 
never able to give the same intensity to the two dimensions [of the strategy]. The United 
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States each time pressured us more on the issue of repression [and] they didn’t show 
anything tangible’ on the development aspect of the Andean Initiative.102 For example, 
alternative development programmes were plagued by problems of design and funding, 
with the United States’ development agency USAID refusing to engage local coca unions 
in the planning and implementation of projects.103 The perception that the US embassy was 
more interested in waging a drug war than in advancing democracy and development linked 
into fears over the ‘Colombianisation’ of Bolivia.104 Here, the militarised approach of the 
United States threatened to spark drug-related violence and economic crisis. Former 
Interior Minister Guillermo Capobianco stated that ‘there was great pressure for counter-
drug policies to be more indiscriminate; tougher, give more emphasis to repression, less 
emphasis to prevention or alternative development’.105 Given local realities and 
ambivalence towards the coca-cocaine economy, the US approach was at times viewed as 
representing the greater threat to social, political and economic stability.106 Such instability 
had potentially serious implications for Bolivia’s still recent democratic transition of 1982. 
These concerns transcended drug war goals and underpinned resistance to US strategies of 
control. 
The ‘Democracy Generation’, the Cold War Legacy and Yankee Imperialism 
For Bolivia’s ‘democracy generation’, protecting the political transition was advanced as an 
overriding priority. Paz Zamora’s government had come to power in the second free and 
fair election of Bolivia’s post-transition period. To prevent legislative deadlock, Paz 
Zamora’s MIR formed a political pact with former dictator – and former persecutor of the 
MIR – Hugo Banzer107 and his right-wing ADN party. While criticised by some for 
perpetuating Bolivia’s patronage politics, this Acuerdo Patriótico (Patriotic Agreement) 
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was hailed as representing a new spirit of compromise and democracy. Paz Zamora 
described this dynamic by reference to the MIR’s struggles under authoritarianism, and the 
party’s commitment to preserving Bolivia’s fledgling democracy.  
<ext>I’m from what’s called – what some in Bolivia call – the democracy 
generation. We were moved to consider the idea of a democratic Bolivia, because 
we were born in the Bolivia of the military golpista […] This was our struggle. We 
were seven years in the underground resistance against the military, with all that 
entailed: exile, imprisonment.108 
These experiences had imbued actors such as Paz Zamora with a sense of mission. 
Forming an alliance with a former enemy demonstrated his commitment to ensuring 
‘democratic governability’ and engendering a ‘democratic culture’ for the first time in 
Bolivia. Resistance to US drug war control was framed against this democratising 
narrative. Where US actors saw misguided denial of the ‘drug problem’ and narco-
corruption, Bolivian actors declared their defence of the country’s vital interests – 
specifically, sustaining a still fragile democratic transition. As fellow MIRista Guillermo 
Capobianco explained, ‘The topic of drugs wasn’t a priority for us. Transforming the 
country was. For the country to transition from the dictatorship of Banzer to democracy: 
this was our priority. Political stability, economic stability, these were our priorities.’109 
Ambassador Gelbard’s abrasive style and the embassy’s strategies of control, including the 
use of US economic power, bypassing of senior officials and pressuring to remove 
‘corrupt’ actors created the sense that Bolivian sovereignty was being compromised. ‘We 
had a strong-willed ambassador of a type … how should I put it? A fanatic’, stated 
Capobianco; ‘the level of dependence on the United States [meant] that the suggestions of 
the ambassador were not really suggestions. They were orders. He was saying, “Right, 
[expletive], do this.”’110 To actors such as Capobianco, animosity towards the United States 
stemmed not only from opposition to the drug war approach, but also from the MIR’s leftist 
roots and the legacy of the Cold War.  
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While going on to adopt a broadly social democratic agenda, the MIR had radical 
beginnings in the student movement. This radicalism had included admiration for the 
Cuban Revolution and anti-US sentiment. Capobianco claimed that the party’s history 
coloured relations with the US embassy. He believed that its victory had irritated the United 
States, and that its subsequent deal with Banzer had blind-sided the embassy. Discussing 
his ministerial responsibility for counter-drugs, Capobianco argued that ‘There was distrust 
of our party due to the way we entered government […] I got the poisoned chalice of 
combatting drugs […] The American ambassador did not want me. He considered me a 
bloody lefty.’111 Indicating that Capobianco’s beliefs were not without some substance, 
Cason stated that the embassy had ‘wrongly’ viewed the MIR as an ‘extremist far left 
party’, and noted a ‘tendency in those days, unfortunately, to stay away from the left, rather 
than to try to get to know them and influence their thinking’.112  
From the perspective of MIRistas within the Bolivian government, this Cold War legacy 
had significant implications for the conduct of the US drug war in Bolivia. The ‘war on 
drugs’ may have replaced the Cold War as justification for US engagement in Bolivia, but 
the same tendencies remained. ‘They faced [the “war on drugs”] with the Cold War 
mentality’, Paz Zamora argued; ‘it was the same personnel that had fought the Cold War. 
[They] didn’t retire, they moved on to another enemy and they took the issue of the day, 
which was drug trafficking.’113 In support of US geopolitical Cold War goals, such 
personnel had backed authoritarian regimes, including the Banzer dictatorship, and had 
helped to suppress leftist actors, such as the MIR. Drawing on narratives of Yankee 
imperialism, Paz Zamora argued that similar US interference in Bolivian politics was 
evident during his government, although this time in service of the drug war and neoliberal 
goals. The post-Cold War US view was ‘“This planet is ours, including Bolivia.” [The 
United States] was already involved in everything here.’114 According to this view, US 
embassy accusations of narco-corruption primarily served to eliminate legitimate 
opposition to US policy and advance the drug war strategy.   
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Accusations of Narco-Corruption 
The capture of Colonel Luis Arce Gómez exposed many of these tensions. Arce Gómez had 
backed the notorious ‘cocaine coup’ in which right-wing elements of the Bolivian military 
formed an alliance with the country’s drug traffickers to overthrow the democratically 
elected leftist coalition, the Unidad Democrática y Popular (Democratic and Popular Unity, 
UDP) and install the regime of General Luis García Meza (1980–1). Following its collapse 
Arce Gómez, the ‘Minister for Cocaine’ – as he had been dubbed by the US media115 – 
went on the run to escape prosecution for his complicity in human rights abuses and drug 
trafficking. In early 1989, the US embassy received intelligence that Arce Gómez was 
living openly in the Bolivian city of Santa Cruz. Reportedly fearful of the consequences of 
bringing the former colonel’s case to a Bolivian court, Paz Zamora authorised the US 
embassy to lead the operation and secretly transport Arce Gómez for trial in the United 
States. Indicating Bolivian perceptions around the fragility of the transition, Gelbard 
claimed that Paz Zamora ‘still feared a military coup, even though the military was 
discredited’.116 The joint DEA-FELCN operation was completed in December 1989 and, 
despite the lack of a US–Bolivian extradition treaty, Arce Gómez was convicted in Miami 
of drug trafficking offences.  
The operation and its fall-out deepened mistrust between the US embassy and the Bolivian 
government. Interior Minister Guillermo Capobianco had been completely bypassed in the 
operation. ‘We didn’t trust Capobianco’, explained Gelbard; ‘we didn’t tell Capobianco 
what we were doing because we were afraid he would blow it. He was from Santa Cruz, 
and we didn’t know what his connections might be with Arce Gómez.’117 Capobianco 
claimed that such exclusion was not unusual, as the United States frequently marginalised 
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his office in the planning and execution of counter-drug operations. He stated that during 
‘the most important operation of my time with respect to combating the mafias [the capture 
of Arce Gómez], I was at a barbeque […] Nobody had told me.’118  
Relations would reach their nadir shortly thereafter, though, following the appointment of 
Faustino Rico Toro to the head of the FELCN in February 1991. To many observers, Rico 
Toro’s appointment was baffling. The former colonel had been heavily implicated in drug 
trafficking and human rights abuses during Bolivia’s authoritarian period.119 In replacing 
trusted US drug war ally General Lucio Áñez, the Bolivian government came under 
immediate pressure. Paz Zamora defended the decision as an attempt to reaffirm Bolivian 
sovereignty over counter-drug operations. 
<ext>[Áñez] was suffering from heart problems. It was bad. Not only could he not 
work, [but] his character was failing; he was fading. The DEA and the entire 
American administration were abusing this, and they acted as they liked. So, I said, 
‘Right, we’re going to put in a Bolivian military man from days gone by; a military 
man with nerve.’ And Rico Toro was there, who was this type of guy, and he hadn’t 
been involved in drug trafficking. But he was from that era, this phase of Bolivian 
military [government], and he carried out certain functions. He was the President of 
the Corporación del Desarrollo [Development Corporation] de Cochabamba, and he 
was a member of General Banzer’s party, who was our ally, so I put him in. I didn’t 
know him well, but I put him in because he was a man – tough – and the Americans 
wouldn’t be able to do whatever they wanted with him. This was the problem; as 
simple as that.120  
From this perspective, Paz Zamora had reasserted Bolivian control, inhibiting the US 
drug war proxy model. Gonzalo Torrico, an ADN government minister, stated that 
‘Capobianco told [the United States] that this is a sovereign country; that the government 
can name whomever it sees fit.’121 The embassy, though, saw it as a cynical attempt to slow 
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down progress in the fight against the coca-cocaine trade and to protect narco-allies: ‘We 
were engaged in trying to train highly capable Bolivian units; […] hard to do, because 
people would get transferred […] The government didn’t want people to be too capable.’122 
Despite Rico Toro’s strong connection to US ally ADN, the embassy held Paz Zamora and 
the MIRistas responsible for the appointment.123 Indeed, Ambassador Gelbard lobbied 
ADN members of the government – reportedly aghast at the news – for Rico Toro’s 
removal: ‘I went to see General Banzer, and I said, “This is just beyond the pale, 
unacceptable. This will destroy the relationship. I have frozen all your aid. I will get others 
to do so too.”’124 This show of US economic and geopolitical power ensured that the 
decision to appoint Rico Toro was quickly reversed. Sensing blood, the embassy then went 
after other ‘corrupt’ officials. The embassy claimed that Paz Zamora’s government had 
received ‘drug trafficker money for their election campaign’; that ‘Guillermo Capobianco 
was the bag man for all this’, and that he was aided by ‘the man who became National 
Police Chief [Felipe Carvajal]’.125 Using the Rico Toro case as leverage, the embassy 
secured the resignations of both men. 
<ext>I called the President and I told him [that] I really needed to talk to him about 
further corruption problems. He invited me over to his house, we sat down and went 
through a bottle and a half of Scotch whisky. I remember – my wife remembers – I 
stumbled home, and I fell into bed saying, ‘God, what I do for my country!’ He 
agreed to get rid of them.126  
Leveraging Political Opponents? 
The exercise of US control was thus backed by the regional hegemon’s power, used to 
maintain its drug war proxies and remove supposedly corrupt officials. For Capobianco, 
though, the US embassy’s efforts to remove him stemmed not from corruption, but from his 
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leftist background and outspoken criticism of the United States. Aside from his radical 
leftist roots, he had publicly criticised the US embassy for its failure to provide adequate 
weaponry to the anti-narcotics police. On a visit to UMOPAR’s base in the Chapare, and in 
the presence of the media and DEA officials, Capobianco ‘said strongly, in raised voice, 
“I’m giving the Ambassador a 72-hour deadline to change these arms and put in place 
modern, functioning arms.”’127 Capobianco claimed the US embassy never forgave him for 
his actions, which challenged the United States and its commitment to counter-drug efforts. 
According to this narrative, US drug war control was used to leverage the removal of a 
politician perceived as hostile to the United States.  
Indeed, Paz Zamora argued that the ‘war on drugs’ was widely applied against him and the 
MIR. Prior to his presidency, Paz Zamora had come under scrutiny after pictures emerged 
of him meeting with known drug trafficker and former army captain Isaac ‘Oso’ Chavarría. 
Allegations of narco-links re-emerged following the end of his term, as Chavarría was 
captured in January 1994 and began to disclose the supposed details of his relationship with 
the MIR. A congressional investigation resulted in the arrest and prosecution of Oscar Eid – 
a prominent MIRista – for his role in accepting campaign contributions from Chavarría. 
Paz Zamora accepted that Chavarría was friendly with the MIR and that he had provided 
‘in-kind’ support to election campaigns, but asserted that no money had changed hands.128 
Meetings between the MIR and Chavarría were dismissed as ‘an error, but not a crime’.129 
The US embassy contradicted this, stating ‘that Paz Zamora and others in his political party 
had received funds’ from the drug trafficker, accusing the now-former president ‘of 
providing cover for Chavarría during his tenure’.130 As a result, Paz Zamora’s US visa was 
revoked in 1996, alongside those of several other MIR members.   
For Paz Zamora, the episode demonstrated attempts by the United States, in conjunction 
with its Bolivian political allies, to sabotage his political career. He argued that most 
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military officers of the García Meza period had links to the drug trade. While Chavarría 
was no different in this regard, Paz Zamora claimed that he had left these links behind by 
the time he expressed support for the party. ‘The other parties saw that this type of guy had 
approached us, and they all used it politically against me’, claimed Paz Zamora, ‘and later, 
the American embassy used it, but [only] when I had left the presidency’.131 Accusations of 
corruption were thus used as a political weapon against Paz Zamora and the MIR: ‘We 
were the youngest party, the new boys […] If anyone had problems with drug trafficking, it 
was the old parties: the MNR, ADN.’ The goal of the United States in all of this was clear 
to Paz Zamora: ‘To sanction a president who had rebelled against certain things and to give 
a message to the political world: be careful! […] I confronted the Americans on the way 
they wanted to act in counter-drugs and also on their neoliberal policies. [I tried to] address 
the abuses and the militarisation, the violence. I didn’t want violence to arrive here.’132 In 
this view, the United States aimed to discredit Paz Zamora and his record, ensuring more 
favourable conditions for the neoliberal agenda of his ‘US-backed’ successor Gonzalo 
Sánchez de Lozada (MNR). ‘They were sure that I was going to return after Sánchez de 
Lozada and reverse [his programme of privatisation]’, Paz Zamora argued; ‘these were the 
typical psychological warfare operations that came from Cold War working methods […] 
The “war on drugs”, like the Cold War, was used to justify everything.’133 
The idea that the United States had used supposed drug links to target political enemies had 
a long history in Bolivia. It was argued that the United States held back evidence of drug 
links until opportune moments. This tactic would be used to maintain control over 
troublesome actors, protect allies or eliminate rivals. For example, in 1961 prominent leftist 
and labour leader Juan Lechín temporarily withdrew from politics following accusations of 
drug corruption by the US embassy and Bolivia’s right-wing press.134 Furthermore, Hugo 
Rodas Morales argues that former allies of García Meza were targeted for their 
involvement in the drug trade post-1982, while Banzer-aligned officers and politicians were 
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kept in play.135 The reason: Banzer and the ADN continued to be useful assets for the 
United States. The threat of scandal, it was argued, forced ‘the major political parties into a 
constant state of alert, [keeping] Bolivian policy in line with US demands […] Those 
Bolivian collaborators closest to the US embassy generally [had] skeletons in their own 
closets.’136 In this view, corruption allegations formed part of the US agenda of control in 
Bolivia: the instrumentalisation of the ‘war on drugs’ followed in the historic lineage of US 
Cold War tactics. 
The Repentance Decree 
Demonstrating the fluidity of power relations, though, the Paz Zamora government 
introduced the Decreto de Arrepentimiento (Repentance Decree) in July 1991. This 
Bolivian-led initiative offered reduced sentences for drug traffickers who turned themselves 
in and cooperated with the authorities. In contrast to the US securitised approach, it sought 
a negotiated settlement with organised crime. Different conceptualisations of Bolivia’s 
‘drug problem’ once more came to the fore, as the government applied a policy aligned 
with Bolivian priorities.  
The US embassy argued that Bolivia’s presence in the global drug trade had increased over 
the course of Paz Zamora’s administration. Whereas previously Bolivian coca paste had 
been exported to Colombia for final processing, Gelbard claimed that local traffickers had 
shifted to producing and transporting cocaine via their own, more lucrative, routes.137 ‘The 
Americans wanted to sustain the theory that Bolivia was already a producer of cocaine, a 
world producer of cocaine’, Paz Zamora argued; ‘I never accepted this; I rejected it.’138 US 
officials were adamant, though, that ‘Bolivia had become the second-largest cocaine 
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producer after Colombia’, processing one-third of Bolivian coca-paste into cocaine within 
the country by 1990.139 Notoriously problematic statistics on the illicit economy140 were 
used to counter the Bolivian narrative that the country’s role in the drug trade was limited 
to humble coca cultivation. The US embassy painted a picture of increasingly influential 
native criminal organisations posing a threat to Bolivian society and politics. As such, the 
embassy argued that the development-led approach favoured by Paz Zamora was 
insufficient to deal with the ‘security threat’ of Bolivia’s coca-cocaine economy. Aligning 
with this narrative, the US embassy planned a large DEA-UMOPAR operation in June 
1991: a raid designed to secure state authority in ‘Bolivia’s Medellín’, Santa Ana de 
Yacuma (Beni department). The aftermath of the operation would open space for the 
Bolivian government to push for a different approach. 
Although the US embassy claimed the operation had significantly disrupted the drug trade 
and re-established ‘Bolivian sovereignty over Santa Ana’, no major traffickers were 
arrested.141 Moreover, the raid became a major source of US–Bolivian discord. In the midst 
of the operation, the local navy garrison commander was detained and accused of collusion 
with drug traffickers.142 Military officers rallied against the actions of the DEA and 
UMOPAR, claiming that the commander had been assaulted, and that the United States had 
exceeded its authority.143 Gelbard’s robust public defence of the operation and further 
accusations of high-level corruption in the Bolivian military stirred more anti-US 
sentiment,144 while reports of heavy-handedness and police brutality added to the public 
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backlash.145 Interior Minister (1991–3) Carlos Saavedra claimed that ‘The city had been 
very angry about the intervention. The army had arrived, the police [and] planes, so the 
population was afraid: kids, people sought refuge in the churches. [It was] like a film.’146 
The incident seemed to confirm Bolivian fears over the ‘Colombianisation’ of the country, 
and the view that US counter-drug operations risked Bolivia’s stability.  
Believing that they had been marginalised in the execution of the Santa Ana operation, the 
Bolivian government sought to capitalise on the negative spin around the episode and 
reassert control. The government introduced new limits on DEA operations147 and, more 
significantly, the Repentance Decree. Saavedra described the aftermath of the operation as 
an opportunity to take a different approach, claiming that the residents of Santa Ana and 
drug traffickers themselves wished to cooperate with the government.  
<ext>A Mrs Roca delivered a letter to me [while I was still in Santa Ana], in which 
she explained that her husband wanted to turn himself in. I took the letter away, I 
read it, and it said that her children couldn’t study in foreign schools because the 
American and Europeans knew about their life and they blocked their studies. And 
that they didn’t have a social life; they lived in hiding and the family were outcasts, 
because of the husband.148  
Just over a month after the raid, the Repentance Decree was passed. In contrast to a 
similar measure in Colombia, Saavedra argued that it was a success: ‘This was the best 
road for the counter-drug fight in Bolivia. Why? Because there was no violence.’149  
The decree halted work towards the introduction of a new US–Bolivian extradition treaty, a 
major goal of the US embassy.150 The embassy also viewed it as allowing traffickers ‘off 
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the hook’. Where the United States had successfully imposed its will in other areas of drug 
policy, here the Bolivian government asserted its own vision. Adding to tensions, Paz 
Zamora pushed through the decree while Ambassador Gelbard was out of the country.151 
According to Saavedra, ‘When [Gelbard] saw the decree he threw out a cry to the heavens, 
got angry and said we should never have made the decree without consulting with them, 
[…] saying that the United States was not going to permit it.’152   
The surrender of seven of Bolivia’s top ten traffickers less than six months after the 
introduction of the decree was held as vindication of this stance. Some argued, though, that 
heightened US-led militarised counter-drug efforts and the possible threat of extradition  
underpinned the willingness of the traffickers to turn themselves in. Other critics claimed 
that reduced sentencing and the prospect of continuing to direct business from prison was 
too good an opportunity for the traffickers to turn down.153 It was clear that the ‘repentant 
ones’ had agreed collectively to hand themselves over to the authorities. There were doubts 
over the veracity of their testimonies, including statements accounting for their drug 
wealth.154 Regardless of these criticisms, the decree was hailed as a success by the Bolivian 
government, representing an alternative approach to that of the United States to the 
problem of drug trafficking. The decree placed local Bolivian priorities ahead of drug war 
goals. 
Conclusion 
In summary, the implementation of the Andean Initiative in Bolivia demonstrates the 
contested nature of US counter-drug policy at the country level. US actors were largely 
informed by the language and logic of securitisation. The perceived security threat posed 
by the coca-cocaine economy was used to justify US counter-drug efforts in Bolivia. US 
strategies of control included bypassing ‘uncooperative’ elements of the Bolivian 
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government and pressuring for the removal of ‘drug-tainted’ officials. These practices were 
held as complementary to stated US goals of forwarding free-market, liberal democracies 
throughout the region. By contrast, the drug trade was generally not conceptualised as a 
national security threat within the Bolivian government, given its relatively peaceful nature 
and importance to the national economy. Militarised US counter-drug policies were instead 
seen as posing a threat to social, political and economic stability. Bolivian interlocutors 
spoke of the drug war’s place within the broader function of US foreign policy in Bolivia. 
The US embassy’s use of leverage over the Bolivian government, for example, represented 
the continuation of Cold War-era ‘imperialist’ politics and tactics: voices critical of US 
policy were targets of drug corruption allegations. For the self-proclaimed ‘democracy 
generation’, the preservation of the country’s still fragile transition was prioritised over the 
‘war on drugs’. This goal led to resistance to securitised US drug war policies, as the 
Bolivian government attempted to navigate domestic imperatives and external US drug war 
demands.  
Accounting for ‘on-the-ground’ dynamics and the ‘messiness’ of counter-drug policy 
implementation, the article thus advances a more nuanced understanding of drug war power 
relations than more simplistic US-centric analyses.  The exercise of US geopolitical and 
economic power was evident in the export of the Andean Initiative to Bolivia, while 
narratives of the drug war shaped the perspectives of key US and Bolivian actors of the 
period. However, the article also demonstrates the need to move beyond these top-down 
approaches, widening analysis beyond narrow ‘drug fetishism’. The issue of counter-drug 
policy was absorbed into the distinct agendas of multiple actors, with historical forces, such 
as the legacy of the Cold War, weighing on interactions between them. Different narratives 
wove these agendas together: domestic imperatives of the drug war ‘justified’ US actions in 
Bolivia, and consolidation of democratic transition ‘justified’ resistance to US 
securitisation. This contextualised analytical approach reveals the instrumentalisation of the 
‘war on drugs’ in US–Bolivian relations of power and control. Such insights deepen our 
understanding of how the US drug war has unfolded in Latin America. 
Bolivia has since cut a new path in its approach to the coca-cocaine economy, although 
many similar dynamics from the Andean Initiative period may be identified. Evo Morales – 
a prominent coca union leader at that time – rose to the presidency in 2006, in part 
propelled by his strong opposition to US influence in Bolivia. Bolstered by fellow ‘pink 
tide’ governments in the region and booming international prices for Bolivian commodities, 
Morales resisted US control. The Bolivian government severed counter-drug cooperation 
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with the United States, expelling Ambassador Philip Goldberg in September 2008, then the 
DEA in January 2009. Morales accused the United States of meddling in the internal affairs 
of the country, drawing on familiar themes of Yankee imperialism. The US response has 
also followed a similar path. The US government has decertified Bolivia on multiple 
occasions for ‘failing’ to fulfil its drug control obligations, while accusing Morales and his 
Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism, MAS) party of narco-
corruption.155 Despite this, Bolivia continues to reject securitised drug war policies, again 
reflecting the view that these lie contrary to local priorities. The Morales government’s 
policy of ‘social control’, for example, seeks a collaborative approach with coca-growing 
communities in limiting cultivation and fostering sustainable development.156 It represents 
a distinctly Bolivian solution to the coca-cocaine economy. Once again, diverging drug war 
narratives are used by US and Bolivian actors to project particular agendas. However, 
where officials of the Paz Zamora government had sought to keep the United States on side 
while pursuing distinct Bolivian aims, Morales’ repudiation of US influence has been clear 
and decisive. The issue of drug control remains embedded in US–Bolivian power relations. 
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in the early 2000s 
5 May 2014, La Paz, Bolivia 
Capobianco, 
Guillermo 
Bolivian interior minister, 1989–
91 
16 April 2014, Santa Cruz, 
Bolivia 
Carnevale, John ONDCP official, 1988–2002 26 April 2013, Washington, 
DC 
Céspedes, Jaime Commander of the Bolivian 
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